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Current Circuit Splits 
The following pages contain brief summaries of circuit splits 
identified by federal court of appeals opinions announced between August 
1, 2016 and December 31, 2016.  This collection, written by the members 
of the Seton Hall Circuit Review, is organized into civil and criminal 
matters, and then by subject matter and court. 
Each summary briefly describes a current circuit split, and it intended 
to give only the briefest synopsis of the circuit split, and not a 
comprehensive analysis.  This compilation makes no claim to be 
exhaustive, but aims to serve the reader well as a referential starting point. 
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National Labor Relations Act – Collective Action Waiver: Morris v. 
Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016) 
The 9th Circuit considered whether an employer violates the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by requiring employees to sign an 
agreement precluding them from bringing a concerted legal claim.  Id. at 
979.  The court noted that the 7th Circuit held that arbitration agreements 
requiring employees to bring claims in “separate proceedings” violates the 
employees’ rights to engage in concerted activity under the NLRA.  Id. at 
983.  The 2nd, 5th, and 8th Circuits all rejected that argument.  Id. at 990 
n.16.  The court, noting the “well-established principle [that] employees 
have the right to pursue work-related legal claims together,” stated that 
concerted activity, as “the right of employees to act together,” is an 
essential and substantive right established by the NLRA.  Id. at 980.  
Accordingly, the 9th Circuit sided with the 7th Circuit and held that a 
“concerted action waiver violates the NLRA and cannot be enforced.”  Id. 
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BANKRUPTCY 
Compliance – Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act: Kingdom 
Fresh Produce, Inc. v. Stokes Law Office, L.L.P. (In re Delta Product, 
L.P.), 845 F.3d 609 (5th Cir. 2016) 
The 5th Circuit addressed the issue of whether special counsel’s fees 
and expenses can be disbursed from a Perishable Agricultural 
Commodities Act (PACA) trust fund before all claimants are paid in 
whole.  Id. at 612.  The court noted that the 2nd Circuit found that a PACA 
trust is unlike most common law trusts, and “sellers, as trust beneficiaries, 
‘are entitled to full payment before trustees may lawfully use trust funds 
to pay other creditors.’”  Id. at 620 (internal citation omitted).  The 2nd 
Circuit determined that “a PACA trustee may not use PACA funds to pay 
attorney’s fees incurred in collecting accounts receivable held in trust for 
a seller of perishable agricultural commodities.”  Id. (internal quotations 
and citation omitted).  The court noted that the 9th Circuit, however, found 
that a bank should be compensated for its collection costs because it 
performed all the work required to collect the PACA trust assets.  Id.  The 
court noted that the 2nd Circuit and 9th Circuit appear to distinguish 
“PACA trustees . . . who owe fiduciary duties to the PACA claims and are 
thus aware of the trust provision[, from] those whose primary role is 
outside the PACA trustee framework and do not owe duties to the 
claimants.”  Id.  After examining the attorney’s role as Special PACA 
Counsel, the 5th Circuit found that while not named “trustee,” the order 
appointing the attorney as Special PACA Counsel allowed him to serve as 
“the functional equivalent of a PACA trustee.”  Id. at 621.  The 5th Circuit 
agreed with the 2nd Circuit “that a PACA trustee–or in this case, its 
functional equivalent–may not be paid from trust assets ‘until full payment 
of the sums owing’ is paid to all claimants.”  Id. at 622 (internal citation 
omitted). 
Proof of Claim – Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: Owens v. LVNV 
Funding, 832 F.3d 726 (7th Cir. 2016) 
The 7th Circuit addressed “whether filing a proof of claim on a stale 
debt in bankruptcy is a misleading or deceptive act prohibited” by the Fair 
Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).  Id. at 734.  The court noted that 
the 11th Circuit held that this constitutes a misleading or deceptive act, 
while the 2nd and 8th Circuits rejected such an approach.  Id. at 735.  The 
court further emphasized the 8th Circuit’s rejection, which relied on the 
2nd Circuit’s opinion, of “a plaintiff-debtor’s request to extend the 
FDCPA to time-barred proofs of claim in a case with nearly identical facts 
to the cases currently before [the court].”  Id.  The court distinguished 
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between an unsophisticated consumer standard, adopted by the 11th 
Circuit, and the competent attorney standard when determining “whether 
the communications would be likely to mislead a competent lawyer.”  Id. 
at 736.  The 7th Circuit joined the 2nd and 8th Circuits in holding that 
where “a reasonably competent lawyer would have had no trouble 
evaluating whether [a] debt was timely,” a proof of claim on a stale debt 
is not a deceptive or misleading act prohibited by the FDCPA.  Id. 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Heightened Pleading Requirements – False Claims: United States ex 
rel. Prather v. Brookdale Senior Living Cmtys., Inc., 838 F.3d 750 (6th 
Cir. 2016) 
The 6th Circuit addressed whether Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure’s heightened pleading standard, requiring a relator to 
“identify an actual false claim,” may be relaxed when the relator “has pled 
facts which support a strong inference that a claim was submitted.”  Id. at 
769.  The court reasoned that an exception to the heightened pleading 
standards “could be applied when a relator alleges specific personal 
knowledge that relates directly to billing practices.”  Id. (internal citation 
omitted).  The court noted that the 8th, 10th, and 11th Circuits have applied 
an “across-the-board heightened standard,” while the 1st, 3rd, 5th, 7th, 9th, 
and D.C. Circuits have applied an “across-the-board permissive 
[standard].”  Id.  Pointing to 8th, 10th, and 11th Circuit decisions, the court 
did note, however, that “[e]very circuit that has applied a heightened 
standard, save ours, has retreated from such a requirement in cases in 
which other detailed factual allegations support a strong inference that 
claims were submitted.”  Id. at 772.  The 6th Circuit adopted an approach 
that, “requires the pleading of representative false claims in the majority 
of cases, while . . . recognizing that a relator may nonetheless survive a 
motion to dismiss by pleading specific facts based on her personal billing-
related knowledge that support a strong inference that specific false claims 
were submitted for payment.”  Id. at 773. 
Interest on Damage Awards – Jones Act: Nevor v. Moneypenny 
Holdings, LLC, 842 F.3d 113 (1st Cir. 2016) 
The 1st Circuit addressed whether a plaintiff is entitled to 
prejudgment interest on an award of damages under the Jones Act.  Id. at 
121.  The 5th Circuit had held that “a seaman is not entitled to prejudgment 
interest when he prevails on parallel Jones Act and unseaworthiness 
claims,” while the 2nd Circuit had held that “when a seaman prevails on 
both Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims and there are no exceptional 
280 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 13:275 
circumstances militating against an award of prejudgment interest, . . . the 
seaman is entitled to prejudgment interest on the total amount of the 
award.”  Id. at 122.  The court began its analysis by noting that “the 
damages award straddles both a successful Jones Act claim and a 
successful unseaworthiness claim.”  Id. at 123.  The court next noted that 
“[w]hen federal and state claims overlap, the plaintiff may choose to be 
awarded damages based on state law if that law offers a more generous 
outcome than federal law.”  Id. at 124.  In the court’s view, the “same 
paradigm seems altogether appropriate where, as here, a plaintiff has 
prevailed on fully aligned Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims.”  Id.  As 
the plaintiff was entitled to interest on the unseaworthiness claims, the 
court joined the 2nd Circuit and held that “when a court, in a bench trial, 
awards damages based on mixed Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims, 
prejudgment interest is available.”  Id. at 123. 
Interlocutory Appeals – Appointment of Counsel: Sai v. Transp. Sec. 
Admin., 843 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2016) 
The 1st Circuit addressed whether a denial of appointed counsel to 
an anti-discrimination claimant is an immediately reviewable collateral 
order.  Id. at 35–36 (internal citations omitted).  The court noted that the 
3rd, 5th, and 9th Circuits allow interlocutory appeals of orders denying 
appointment of counsel, while the 6th, 7th, and 11th do not allow 
interlocutory appeals of such orders.  Id. at 35 (citing Ficken v. Alvarez, 
146 F.3d 978, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).  The 1st Circuit agreed with the 6th, 
7th, and 11th because “a wrongful request for appointed counsel should 
not easily escape review after entry of final judgment.”  Sai, 843 F.3d at 
36.  The court disagreed with the 3rd, 5th, and 9th Circuits in finding that 
anti-discrimination claims are an immediately reviewable order.  Id.  The 
1st Circuit concluded that “while we decline at this time to join those 
circuits treating a denial of appointed counsel to an anti-discrimination 
claimant as an immediately reviewable collateral order, we intimate no 
doubts about the reviewability of such a denial in an appeal from a final 
judgment.”  Id. at 36. 
Jurisdiction – In Rem & Personal Jurisdiction: United States v. 
Batato, 833 F.3d 413 (4th Cir. 2016) 
The 4th Circuit addressed whether the district court’s assertion that 
it had in rem jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1355(b)(2) was a proper 
interpretation of the statute with regard to assets in foreign countries.  Id. 
at 418.  The court noted that the 2nd Circuit read the statute as still 
requiring the “traditional paradigm, [that] ‘the court must have actual or 
constructive control over the res when an in rem forfeiture suit is 
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initiated.’”  Id. at 419.  The 3rd, 9th, and D.C. Circuits have instead held 
that the statute “establishes jurisdiction in those courts,” because § 1355 
effectively dispenses with the traditional requirement.  Id.  In determining 
whether the statute addresses venue or jurisdiction, the court looked to the 
legislative history and plain meaning of the text.  Id. at 420.  Accordingly, 
the court rejected the 2nd Circuit’s reasoning by holding that “courts may 
acquire jurisdiction by operation of the provision.”  Id.  The 4th Circuit 
joined the 3rd, 9th, and D.C. Circuits in holding that the statute establishes 
jurisdiction, rather than venue, in certain courts.  Id. at 419. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Civil Rights – Prison Litigation Reform Act: Aref v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 
242 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 
The D.C. Circuit addressed the issue of “whether injuries that are 
allegedly neither mental nor emotional are compensable under the [Prison 
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)] without a prior showing of physical 
injury.”  Id. at 262.  The court noted that the 2nd, 3rd, 10th, and 11th 
Circuits have held that 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) “precludes compensatory 
damages for any claim that does not include physical harm,” and instead, 
focus on the “type of injury asserted.”  Id. at 262–63 (emphasis in 
original).  The court further noted that the majority of circuits imply that 
mental or emotional injuries encompass a constitutional violation where 
there is no physical harm.  Id. at 263.  The court stated that a minority of 
circuits, including the 6th and 7th Circuits, have held that constitutional 
violations are distinct from mental or emotional harm.  Id.  The D.C. 
Circuit agreed with the narrow approach of the 6th and 7th Circuits.  Id.  
The court reasoned that Congress did not intend for physical injury to be 
a requirement of every claim.  Id.  The court stated that if this was 
Congress’s intent, “the statute could simply have provided: ‘No Federal 
civil action may be brought by a prisoner . . . for any injury suffered while 
in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.’”  Id. (citations 
omitted) (emphasis in original).  The court further reasoned that the 
“mental and emotional” language is important because other types of 
intangible injury claims can be made.  Id. at 264.  The D.C. Circuit held 
that “there exists a universe of injuries that are neither mental nor 
emotional and for which plaintiffs can recover compensatory damages 
under the PLRA.”  Id. at 265. 
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Public Health & Welfare Law – Maternity & Children: Nat’l Inst. of 
Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 2016) 
The 9th Circuit addressed a split regarding the appropriate level of 
scrutiny to apply to abortion-related disclosure cases.  Id. at 837.  The court 
noted that the 5th and 8th Circuits “applied a ‘reasonableness’ test when 
determining whether an abortion-related disclosure law violated 
physicians’ First Amendment rights.”  Id. at 837.  The court also noted that 
the 4th Circuit ruled that the Supreme Court’s previous decisions 
in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833 (1992) and Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) did not 
announce a level of scrutiny to apply in abortion-related disclosure cases.  
Id. at 838.  The 9th Circuit agreed with the 4th Circuit’s interpretation that 
the Supreme Court did not clearly speak to the level of scrutiny to apply 
in these types of cases.  Id.  Therefore, the 9th Circuit joined the 4th Circuit 
and applied intermediate scrutiny to the disclosures.  Id. 
Standing – Article III: Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. 
App’x 384 (6th Cir. 2016) 
The 6th Circuit addressed whether an increased risk of identity theft 
satisfies the injury requirement to establish Article III standing.  Id. at 388.  
The court noted that the 7th and 9th Circuits held that an increased risk of 
identity theft satisfies the injury requirement for Article III standing, while 
the 3rd Circuit held otherwise.  Id. at 389.  The court reasoned that the 
Supreme Court has “found standing based on a ‘substantial risk’ that the 
harm will occur, which may prompt plaintiffs to reasonably incur costs to 
mitigate or avoid that harm” even when it is not “literally certain the harm 
they identify will come about.”  Id. at 388.  The court further reasoned that 
“[w]here a data breach targets personal information, a reasonable 
inference can be drawn that the hackers will use the victims’ data for the 
fraudulent purposes alleged in Plaintiff’s complaints.”  Id.  The court also 
noted that “when plaintiffs already know that they have lost control of their 
data, it would be unreasonable to expect [them] to wait for actual misuse,” 
rather, it is reasonable to expect them to “expend time and money to 
monitor their credit, check their bank statements, and modify their 
financial accounts.”  Id.  Therefore, the 6th Circuit held that an increased 
risk of identity theft satisfy the Injury requirement for Article III standing 
because the costs reasonably incurred by plaintiffs are concrete injuries 
“suffered to mitigate an imminent harm.”  Id. at 389. 
2017] Current Circuit Splits 283 
Statutory Interpretation – Vagueness Doctrine: Golicov v. Lynch, 837 
F.3d 1065 (10th Cir. 2016) 
The 10th Circuit addressed whether “the [Immigration and 
Nationality Act’s (INA)] definition of ‘crime of violence,’ 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(F), which expressly incorporates 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)’s 
definition of that same term, is unconstitutionally vague in light of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson [v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 
(2015)].”  Lynch, 837 F.3d at 1068.  The court began its inquiry with a 
determination as to the applicability of the vagueness doctrine, which is 
derived from the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, to 
immigration proceedings.  Id.  The court joined with the 6th and 9th 
Circuits in finding that “because deportation strips a non-citizen of his 
rights, statutes that impose this penalty are subject to vagueness challenges 
under the Fifth Amendment.”  Id. at 1069.  The 10th Circuit then 
considered whether the residual definition of “crime of violence” under 
§ 1101(a)(43)(F) of the INA, which mirrors a residual clause rendered 
unconstitutional by Johnson, was also unconstitutionally vague as applied 
in the context of immigration proceedings.  Id. at 1070.  The court noted 
that both the 6th and 9th Circuits have held that the INA’s residual clause 
in § 1101(a)(43)(F) is unconstitutional, as the INA expressly incorporates 
the definition of § 16(b), which was similar to the residual clause at issue 
in Johnson.  Id. at 1071.  The court also noted that the 5th and 7th Circuits 
have considered “similar Johnson-based vagueness challenges” to a 
statute also incorporating § 16(b)’s definition of “crime of violence”—the 
7th Circuit finding § 16(b) and the residual clause in Johnson “materially 
indistinguishable,” while the 5th Circuit labeling them as “textually 
distinct.”  Id. at 1072 (internal quotations omitted).  The court agreed with 
the 6th, 7th, and 9th Circuits’ interpretation of § 16(b), and concluded “that 
§ 16(b) is not meaningfully distinguishable from the [Johnson] residual 
clause and that, as a result, § 16(b), and by extension § 1101(a)(43)(F), 
must be deemed unconstitutionally vague in light of Johnson.”  Id. 
EMPLOYMENT LAW 
ERISA Benefits – Settlement Procedure: Rothstein v. Am. Int’l Grp., 
Inc., 837 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 2016) 
The 2nd Circuit considered whether Employment Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) benefit plans may be deemed 
“affiliates” of the company that sponsors them, for purposes of 
determining the distribution of a class action settlement.  Id. at 198.  The 
court noted that this inquiry turned on the degree of sponsor’s “control” 
over the plan.  Id. at 206–07.  The court also noted that the 7th Circuit, in 
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reaching this inquiry, held that a company had control over a benefit plan 
it had sponsored because it had appointed the plan’s administrator, a 
committee which “serve[d] at the pleasure of [the company’s] Board of 
Directors,” and therefore, the plan was deemed an “affiliate” of the 
company.  Id. at 207 (internal quotations omitted).  The court declined to 
adopt the approach of the 7th Circuit, however, finding that to the extent 
that its approach can be interpreted as declaring that “all ERISA plans are 
all ‘affiliates’ of their sponsors,” such an interpretation fails to account for 
the statutory limitations that ERISA imposes on the sponsor’s control over 
a benefit plan.  Id.  Rather, the court determined that ERISA’s 
requirements, which were designed to insulate the plan from being 
manipulated in a manner consistent with the interests of the plan’s sponsor, 
reinforce that the sponsor’s control over the plan is “specifically 
circumscribed” to prevent management of the plan in a way that would 
adversely affect the plan’s beneficiaries.  Id. at 208.  Thus, the 2nd Circuit 
held that a sponsor’s ability to appoint and remove the plan’s 
administrator, or even to disband the plan entirely, did not warrant a 
finding of “control” sufficient to deem the plan an “affiliate” of the 
sponsor company because ERISA imposes a “strict fiduciary duties [to 
block] such corporate influence.”  Id. at 209. 
SECURITIES LAW 
Administrative Law Judge Discretion – Administrative Proceedings:  
Bandimere v. United States SEC, 844 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2016) 
The 10th Circuit addressed whether the SEC’s Administrative Law 
Judges (ALJs) are inferior officers and must therefore be appointed 
properly under the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution.  Id. at 
1170.  The D.C. Circuit held that ALJs were employees rather than inferior 
officers because they were unable to render final decisions.  Id. at 1182.  
The court relied on the holding in Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue, 501 U.S. 868 (1991), that the duties of IRS special trial judges 
(STJs), who are classified as inferior officers, and reasoned that they are 
analogous to the SEC’s ALJs.  Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1182.  As a result, 
the court reasoned ALJs should also be classified as inferior officers and 
therefore subject to the Appointments Clause.  Id. at 1179.  The 10th 
Circuit disagreed with the D.C. Circuit, citing Freytag, which utilized a 
number of factors to determine inferior officer status, only one of which 
was the ability to make final decisions.  Id. (international citations 
omitted).  The 10th Circuit declined to follow the D.C. Circuit and held 
that SEC ALJs are inferior officers subject to the Appointments Clause.  
Id. at 1188. 
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CRIMINAL 
CONSPIRACY 
Juvenile Delinquency Act – Relevancy of Pre-Majority Acts: United 
States v. Camez, 839 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2016) 
The 9th Circuit addressed whether the Juvenile Delinquency Act 
(“JDA”) precludes pre–majority conduct as substantive proof in a 
conspiracy case spanning the defendant’s eighteenth birthday.  Id. at 874.  
The court noted that the D.C. Circuit held that under the JDA, only post–
majority acts could be considered as proof of guilt in an adult proceeding 
while the 1st, 2nd, 6th, 10th, and 11th Circuits found that the JDA imposed 
no limitation on the use of pre–majority conduct as proof of guilt in adult 
proceedings.  Id. at 875–877.  The court agreed with the 10th and 11th 
Circuits in finding that precluding pre–majority conduct would 
erroneously suggest that Congress intended the JDA to substantively alter 
the standard for proving conspiracy cases spanning a defendant’s 
eighteenth birthday.  Id. at 875.  To that end, the court was persuaded that 
pre–majority acts could substantively prove crimes spanning a defendant’s 
eighteenth birthday because it found the scenario analogous to contract 
ratification—much as a minor could ratify an illegally formed contract 
upon attaining majority, so to could a pre–majority crime be ratified by 
post-majority involvement.  Id. at 876.  Therefore, the court joined the 1st, 
2nd, 6th and 11th Circuits and found that the JDA did not preclude the use 
of pre-majority acts as proof of guilt in a conspiracy case spanning a 
defendant’s eighteenth birthday, but declined to determine what 
limitations the JDA placed on the use of such proof.  Id. at 876–877. 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Custody – Alien Detention: Preap v. Johnson, 831 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 
2016) 
The 9th Circuit analyzed the scope of the mandatory detention 
provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1), of the Immigration and Naturalization 
Act (“INA”).  Id. at 1199. Specifically, § 1226(c)(1) mandates the 
Attorney General detain any alien who commits a crime enumerated in the 
provision, “when the alien is released” from criminal custody.  Id.  The 
circuits are split as to whether the “when the alien is released” language in 
the mandatory detention provision is a “time-limiting clause”—meaning 
such detention is only mandatory if it occurs immediately upon a subject 
alien’s release from criminal custody—or, whether the mandatory 
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detention provision is a “duty-triggering clause,” creating a duty to detain 
the subject alien at any time after they are released from criminal custody.  
Id at 1200.  The 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 10th Circuits have held that the 
mandatory detention provision is a duty-triggering clause, and that 
authority to detain is not lost even when not done promptly upon release 
from criminal custody.  Id. at 1196.  The 1st Circuit held, however, that 
the mandatory detention provision is a time-limiting clause, only granting 
authority to detain if done promptly after a subject alien’s release from 
criminal custody.  Id. at 1196–97.  The 9th Circuit sided with the 1st 
Circuit, stating that  the legislature acts deliberately in selecting the 
words—and their meaning—in a statute, and thus included “when the alien 
is released” so as to authorize mandatory detention only at that time when 
the alien is released.  Id. at 1200. 
Habeas Corpus – Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Visciotti v. 
Martel, 839 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2016) 
The 9th Circuit addressed whether an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim, in regards to cause and prejudice, receives review in 
deference to the state court determination considering the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).  Id. at 864.  The court 
noted that the 7th Circuit determined that ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims in the cause and prejudice context employ a deferential standard of 
review, while the 6th and 3rd Circuits found a de novo standard of review 
proper.  Id. at 864 n.13.  The 9th Circuit agreed with the 6th and 3rd 
Circuits in finding that the AEDPA does not establish a statutory high 
hurdle for the issue of cause.  Id.  The court found that the AEDPA did not 
change the cause and prejudice standard as there was no indication in the 
statute to the contrary.  Id. at 865.  Thus, the 9th Circuit concluded 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the cause and prejudice context 
receive de novo review.  Id. 
Habeas Corpus – Scope of Review: Wilson v. Warden, 834 F.3d 1227 
(11th Cir. 2016) 
The 11th Circuit addressed whether a federal habeas court should 
look through a state appellate court’s summary decision denying a 
petitioner relief to the reasoning in a lower state court decision when 
deciding whether the state appellate court’s decision is entitled to 
deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).  Id. at 1247.  The court noted that 
that the 5th, 4th, 9th, 1st, and 7th Circuits have held that courts must 
“review the last reasoned state court decision.”  Id. at 1241.  The court, 
however, also points out that only the 4th and 9th Circuits have expressly 
applied this this rule.  Id.  The court reasoned that “appellate courts may 
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affirm for different reasons, presuming that state appellate courts affirm 
only for the precise reasons given by a lower court deprives them of the 
benefit of the doubt,” that is required.  Id. at 1242.  As such, the 11th 
Circuit disagreed with the other circuits and held that federal habeas courts 
need not look through a summary decision on the merits to review the 
reasoning of the lower state court.  Id. 
Search and Seizure – Trash Pull Evidence: United States v. Abernathy, 
843 F.3d 243 (6th Cir. 2016) 
The 6th Circuit addressed “whether and under what circumstances 
trash pull evidence, standing alone, can establish probable cause to search 
a home.”  Id. at 252.  The court noted that the 8th Circuit had determined 
that probable cause existed in a analogous factual situation because “not 
only [did] the presence of discarded marijuana stems and seeds reasonably 
suggest that ongoing marijuana consumption or trafficking is occurring 
within the premises, but the simple possession of marijuana seeds is itself 
a crime under both federal and state law.”  Id.  The 6th Circuit, however, 
noted that they had previously noted in dicta “that mere trash pull 
evidence, standing alone, is insufficient to create probable cause to search 
a residence.”  Id .at 253.  The court further reasoned that “although the 
trash pull evidence certainly suggested that someone in the residence had 
smoked marijuana recently, that fact alone [did] not create an inference 
that the residence contained additional drugs.”  Id. at 255.  As such, the 
court held that the trash pull evidence was insufficient, alone, to establish 
probable cause.  Id. at 256. 
Sentencing Guidelines – Habeas Corpus Petition: Hill v. Masters, 836 
F.3d 591 (6th Cir. 2016) 
The 6th Circuit examined the right of a prisoner to bring successive 
habeas corpus petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to challenge the 
misapplication of a sentence enhancement.  Id. at 592.  The court noted 
that the 4th Circuit recently held that a criminal defendant who has not 
shown actual innocence relating to the underlying conviction can not be 
found “actually innocent” of a sentence enhancement.  Id. at 598.  
Alternatively, the 7th Circuit found a petition challenging the career-
offender enhancement was sufficient where it satisfied three conditions 
under the savings-clause exception, allowing relief under §2241.  Id. at 
599.  The court reasoned that serving a sentence under mandatory 
guidelines, which were subsequently lowered by retroactive Supreme 
Court precedent, is similar to serving a sentence above the statutory 
maximum in that both “are beyond what is called for by law.”  Id. at 599.  
Therefore, the court sided with the 7th Circuit in holding that a petition 
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can indeed be brought under § 2241 in certain circumstances.  Id. at 599—
600.  The court held that such a petition can be brought if: “(1) prisoners 
who were sentenced under the mandatory guidelines regime pre-United 
States v. Booker, (2) who are foreclosed from filing a successive petition 
under § 2255, and (3) when a subsequent, retroactive change in statutory 
interpretation by the Supreme Court reveals that a previous conviction is 
not a predicate offense for a career-offender enhancement.”  Id. 
Statutory Interpretation – Sentencing Enhancement Guidelines: 
United States v. Canelas-Amador, 837 F.3d 668 (6th Cir. 2016) 
The 6th Circuit addressed the issue of which definition of 
“conviction” applies when a court is determining whether a “‘Waiver of 
Trial by Jury and Acceptance of Plea of Guilty’ constitute[s] a ‘conviction 
for a felony that is . . . a crime of violence,’ mandating a sixteen-point 
[sentencing] enhancement under the guideline provision applicable to 
Illegal Reentry.  Id. at 670.  The court noted that the 4th, 5th, 10th, and 
11th Circuits determined that the Immigration and Naturalization Act, 
specifically 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) definition of “conviction” controls, 
while the 1st, 2nd, and 9th Circuits have applied the definition in the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.2(a)(4).  Id.  The 6th Circuit 
reasoned that in this case, due the insufficiency of the tools of statutory 
interpretation, “there remains a not insignificant doubt as to which 
definition should apply.”  Id. at 674.  The 6th Circuit explained that “when, 
in criminal cases, the tools of statutory interpretation do not resolve a 
question, where significant doubt or uncertainty lingers, [the court] must 
construe the provision in favor of the defendant.”  Id.  Therefore, the 6th 
Circuit agreed with the 4th, 5th, 10th, and 11th Circuits that “the more 
restrictive definition set forth in § 1101(a)(48)(A) applies.”  Id. 
EVIDENCE 
Prior Act – Nolo Contendere Pleas: United States v. Green, 842 F.3d 
1299 (11th Cir. 2016) 
The 11th Circuit analyzed “whether a criminal conviction pursuant 
to a nolo [contendere] plea can be admitted to prove a prior act under 
[FRE] 404(b).”  Id. at 1311.  The 8th Circuit had held that there is no 
meaningful difference between guilty convictions—which are permissible 
to use under Rule 404(b)—and  convictions based on nolo pleas, since 
nolo pleas “constitute[] an admission of ‘every essential element of the 
offense (that is) well pleaded in the charge.’”  Id. at 1316.  The 9th Circuit 
held that nolo convictions could not prove a crime was committed, absent 
other evidence.  Id.  The 9th Circuit was persuaded by the fact that Rule 
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803(22) “provides an exception to the hearsay rule for judgments of felony 
conviction resulting from guilty pleas, but not nolo pleas,” and thus nolo 
pleas ought not be admitted to prove the truth of the matters they assert.  
Id.  The 11th Circuit agreed with the 9th Circuit, similarly grounding its 
conclusion in Rule 803(22), which the court found strongly supported the 
“argument that a conviction based on a nolo plea should not as a general 
matter, be considered for the truth of the matter asserted.”  Id. at 1318–19.  
The 11th Circuit held that “to have Rule 404(b) prior act evidence 
admitted, the proponent need only provide enough evidence for the trial 
court to be able to conclude that the jury could find, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that the prior act had been proved.”  Id. at 1319. 
 
